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Note
Self-Determination, Sovereignty, and the
Failure of States: Somaliland and the Case
for Justified Secession
Aaron Kreuter*
INTRODUCTION
Two distinct regions divide modern-day Somalia. On one
hand, this division is geographical. On the other, it cuts much
deeper, between peace and violence, and stability and
instability. Clan tensions, widespread civil war, and maritime
piracy mar the southern half of the country.1 The government is
powerless to combat the instability, resulting in an exodus of
Somali refugees into the nearby countries of Kenya and Yemen.2
The lives of the residents in the south consist of a struggle for
survival amidst violence and anarchy.3
The situation in the north, the region of Somaliland, is
conspicuously different.4 Until the middle part of last decade,
the inhabitants of the region participated actively in the civil

* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2008, University of
Minnesota. The author would like to thank Ray Konz for his thoughtful comments
and advice, and all the other members the Journal for their contributions to this
Note.
1. Robert Draper, Shattered Somalia, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 2009, at 76–
77; see also Austin Bay, The Pirates of Puntland, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/nov/28/the-pirates-of-puntland
(discussing the use of Somalia as a base by the pirates of Somalia).
2. Draper, supra note 1, at 77.
3. Id. at 79 (“Asked to recall memories of when life was good, Mohammed
stares out toward sea. His smile is not of the youthful kind. ‘I don’t remember any,’
he says.”).
4. See id. at 86. There is another region in north Somalia known as Puntland,
to the east and distinct from Somaliland. Though the populations are similar,
Puntland is geographically smaller and significantly more politically unstable than
Somaliland. See Bay, supra note 1.
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war that continues to rage in the south.5 In 1996, however, the
leaders of the northern clans agreed to cooperate in a peace
conference where they gathered “to reconcile clan conflicts at
what one participant call[ed] ‘the Guinness record kind of
conference—months of talking and finally agreeing on a charter
to set up a government. And while we were having this
conference, out in the countryside, everyone came and put their
guns under a tree.’”6 Since the people of Somaliland unilaterally
decided to pursue peace, the region has enjoyed a period of
relative stability.7 It has not enjoyed corresponding economic
prosperity, however, partly because Somaliland is unable to
form meaningful relationships with other nations, who refuse to
recognize the government of Somaliland as independent from
Somalia.8 For this reason, the people of Somaliland wish to
secede from Somalia, but no government currently recognizes
their right to independence.9
This Note seeks to analyze Somaliland’s assertion of
independence in light of international norms and theories of
self-determination and secession, and to propose a solution to
the deficiency in the law as it currently stands. Part I outlines
the principles of statehood, the various legal standards of selfdetermination, the legal justifications for secession, and the
right to territorial integrity. Part I also discusses political
problems with recognizing seceding states, and the recent
history and status of Somaliland and Somalia. Part II discusses
the applicability and implications of each of the various legal
standards and theories as they relate to Somaliland’s case for
secession. This Part concludes that under the current
international standards, Somaliland lacks a sufficient legal
basis to separate and become an independent, sovereign nation.
Part III lays out an answer to this problem whereby, in limited
circumstances, citizens within a failed state may justifiably
secede.

5.
6.
7.

Draper, supra note 1, at 86.
Id.
Scott Baldauf, In Somalia’s Break-Away Corner, an Oasis of Stability,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 11, 2009, at 6.
8. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86.
9. The Nation Nobody Knows, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2001, at 42 (“Somaliland
is not recognised as independent by anybody . . . .”).
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I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATE INDEPENDENCE:
ISSUES OF STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION,
AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
A. TWO COMPETING THEORIES OF STATEHOOD
The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States of 1933 is often cited as a primary international legal
instrument defining the concept of statehood.10 It contains the
following prescription: a state “shall constitute a sole person in
the eyes of international law.”11 For this reason, “States are
juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity
in their exercise.”12 To be a state, a territory must have “a) a
permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government;
and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”13
Furthermore, “The political existence of the state is independent
of recognition by the other states.”14
The Montevideo Convention is the clearest statement of the
declaratory theory of statehood.15 The declarative theory
requires two things: that the prospective state meets each of the
four elements listed above and that the state declares its
sovereignty.16 Thus, statehood does not depend on recognition or
acknowledgement by other nations.17 The United Nations has
contributed to the development of this theory since the time of
the Montevideo Convention by acknowledging the importance of
democracy, equal rights, and respect for self-determination.18
Some argue, however, that in practice, states place at least some
10. See generally, Eric Ting-Lun Huang, The Modern Concept of Sovereignty,
Statehood and Recognition: A Case Study of Taiwan, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 99, 111–
12 (2003) (citing the Montevideo Convention as a key document in determining a
modern state’s statehood and sovereignty).
11. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 2, Dec. 26, 1933, 49
Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
12. Id. art. 4.
13. Id. art. 1.
14. Id. art. 3.
15. Brad Poore, Note, Somaliland: Shackled to a Failed State, 45 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 117, 136 (2009).
16. Huang, supra note 10, at 116 (“[A] political entity that acquires the criteria
for statehood does not become a state unless it declares that it is an independent
sovereign state. This is derived from international custom that a declaration of the
establishment of a state is necessary to create a new state.”).
17. See Poore, supra note 15, at 136 (“[T]he theory holds that a state exists
when four conditions are met, regardless of political recognition.”).
18. See Huang, supra note 10, at 116–18 (discussing the evolution of the
declarative theory since the advent of the United Nations).
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importance on the issue of recognition by other states.19
The practical importance of recognitions has led to a second
theory—the constitutive theory of statehood.20 Proponents of
this theory assert that a state becomes a legal person once other
nations recognize it as such.21 Recognition occurs when a nation
publicly accepts the existence of the state.22 This theory, despite
having fallen out of favor during the decades since World War II,23
has lately enjoyed a modest resurgence.24 Nevertheless, critics
argue that this approach leads to uncertainty, especially when
some nations choose to recognize a state but others do not.25
They also contend that it hinders the exercise of the right of selfdetermination because it places more importance upon the
judgment of the recognizing nation than upon the rights of the
state exercising self-determination.26

19. See, e.g., William Thomas Worster, Law, Politics, and the Conception of the
State in State Recognition Theory, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 115, 119 (2009) (discussing
criticisms of the declarative theory, including that state practice may not support it
and that recognition may be more important to statehood).
20. Id. at 118 (“The constitutive theory provides that a state is only a state
upon the political act of recognition by other states.”).
21. See Poore, supra note 15, at 136.
22. See K. William Watson, When in the Course of Human Events: Kosovo’s
Independence and the Law of Secession, 17 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 267, 288 (2008)
(“An entity aspiring to the legal status of statehood effectively requires the
acceptance of its potential peers.”).
23. See generally, Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International
Law, 53 YALE L.J. 385, 420 (1944) (“States . . . enter into legal relations with one
another in conformity with their own will by virtue of the act of recognition. Prior to
that act no relations of a legal nature can exist between them.” (citing G. W. F.
Hegel, ENZYKLOPADIE DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN WISSENSCHAFTEN IM GRUNDRISSE
§§ 545, 547 (Rosenkranz ed., 1870))).
24. See Worster, supra note 19, at 120.
25. Id. The current situation in Kosovo is one such example of this uncertainty.
The issue of Kosovar secession is currently before the International Court of Justice,
in light of the uncertainty caused by recognition by the U.S., U.K., and France
(among others) and the refusal to recognize by countries like Serbia and Russia.
G.A. Res. 63/3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=21&case=141&code=kos&p3=0; see also
Christopher J. Borgen, The Language of the Law and the Practice of Politics: Great
Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South
Ossetia, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 6–7 (2009).
26. See Worster, supra note 19, at 120 (“Some have argued that the declaratory
theory emerged because of objections to the discretion of states, as well as a
principled acknowledgment of the role of self-determination.”).
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B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL STANDARDS RELATED TO SELFDETERMINATION

The modern concept of self-determination has its roots in a
speech before Congress by President Woodrow Wilson in 1918.27
In this speech, Wilson announced fourteen points for “a program
of peace” that he felt would protect the world from a repeat of
the horrors of the First World War.28 The fifth point stated that,
when “determining . . . questions of sovereignty the interests of
the populations concerned must have equal weight with the
equitable claims of the government whose title is to be
determined.”29 Citizens of a country, President Wilson argued
elsewhere, had “a right to choose the sovereignty under which
they shall live.”30
Despite both the passage of nearly a century since
President Wilson’s speech and the prominent status of the right
to self-determination within various international treaties and
instruments,31 no norm has emerged which comprehensively
27. The concept of self-determination, however, is older than Woodrow Wilson’s
Fourteen Points. The French Revolution is one notable example of early selfdetermination efforts. Borgen, supra note 25, at 4; see also Christopher J. Borgen,
Imagining Sovereignty, Managing Secession: The Legal Geography of Eurasia’s
“Frozen Conflicts”, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 477, 482–83 (2007) (detailing the rise of the
self-determination concept during the early part of the 20th century).
28. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress (Jan. 8, 1918) (“What we
demand . . . is that the world . . . be made safe for every peace-loving nation. . . . All
the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest. . . . The program of
the world’s peace, therefore, is our program . . . .”).
29. Id.
30. President Woodrow Wilson, Gridiron Dinner Address (Feb. 26, 1916) in THE
POLITICS OF WOODROW WILSON: SELECTIONS FROM HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, at
260 (August Heckscher ed., 1956).
31. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (“To develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”);
Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising
From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 2, July 4 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1488,
1498 (1992) [hereinafter Badinter Commission] (“[T]he principle of the right to selfdetermination serves to safeguard human rights.”); International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1988, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (“All
peoples have the right of self-determination.”); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights art. 1(1), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“All peoples have the
right of self-determination.”); Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
Supp. No. 28, at 122, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on
Friendly Relations] (“[A]ll peoples have the right freely to determine, without
external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and
cultural development, and every state has the duty to respect this right . . . .”).
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defines the scope of the right to self-determination.32 Numerous
cases evince this lack of clarity—as in Indonesia, the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam, Algeria,33 and more recently, Kosovo and
South Ossetia.34 Academic commentators also disagree as to the
meaning of both the declarative and constitutive theories of selfdetermination; some contend that a broad application is proper
in order to reconcile international legal disputes, and others say
that such theories serve no practical purpose other than as tools
of analysis.35
Notwithstanding the differing interpretations of the right to
self-determination, three international legal principles have
emerged in regard to nascent state sovereignty. The most
established of the three principles holds that a colonized region
has a right to self-determination—that is, a right to determine
its future free from the interference of a colonizer.36 Today,
because the pervasiveness of colonialism has dwindled since

32. See Peter Hilpold, What Role for Academic Writers in Interpreting
International Law? A Rejoinder to Orakhelashvili, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 291, 292
(2009) (“[T]here can be no doubt that the law of self-determination is one of the most
non-transparent areas of international law, in which the drafters of the relevant
norms played with ambiguity and half-hearted concessions and denials.”); Jure
Vidmar, International Legal Responses to Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, 42
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 779, 808–09 (2009) (discussing the need to “clarify the
ambiguities associated with the applicability of the right of self-determination in
non-colonial contexts”).
33. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
258–60 (1979) (detailing the self-determination efforts of each of the three countries,
and how the self-determination efforts of each led to independence).
34. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 7 (discussing remaining questions regarding
self-determination in the context of Kosovo and South Ossetia, including “what the
scope of the right would be—who can claim a right to self-determination and what
right does that entail?”).
35. The clearest example of this debate can be found in the series of articles
and responses between Hilpold and Orakhelashvili. Compare Hilpold, supra note 32,
at 292–93 (“The principle of self-determination is one of the most powerful
intellectual tools allowing for changes in an otherwise static international
community. . . . [I]t must be considered that the international community is formed
by States holding widely different opinions on many issues, among them the right to
self-determination.”) with Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Kosovo UDI between
Agreed Law and Subjective Perception: A Response to Hilpold, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L.
285, 287 (2009) (“Theory in this particular context is valuable only to the extent that
it conceptualizes the principle of self-determination as is actually accepted as part of
international law; short of that, theory becomes little more than the advancement of
one’s personal perception.”).
36. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 31, at 124 (citing the
Declaration’s partial purpose “[t]o bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due
regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned”).
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World War II under the influence of the United Nations,37 this
method of self-determination has limited relevance.38 Second,
international custom recognizes a right to internal selfdetermination—that is, dissatisfied constituents have the right
to use existing political processes as a tool for selfdetermination.39 Finally, international custom also recognizes
external self-determination—that is, secession.40 When secession
occurs against the wishes of the parent state, it is rarely
acknowledged.41 For example, the United Nations refuses to
admit into membership states which have illegally seceded.42
C. THOUGH THE LAW OF SECESSION IS NOT SETTLED, THREE
METHODS OF SECESSION EXIST
The law of secession remains largely unsettled, reflecting
the ambiguity surrounding the law of self-determination. Case
law over the last century fails to identify a definite standard
that fully remedies this lack of clarity.43 Academic
commentators disagree as to the applicability to secession of any
of the legal standards of statehood and self-determination,44 and
37. See Pamela Epstein, Behind Closed Doors: “Autonomous Colonization” in
Post United Nations Era—The Case for Western Sahara, 15 ANN. SURV. INT’L &
COMP. L 107, 135–36 (2009) (“Member states [in the U.N.] are under a duty to bring
about a speedy end to colonialism, including due regard for the freely expressed will
of the peoples concerned.”).
38. See Vidmar, supra note 32, at 808.
39. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 282 (Can.) (“The
recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination
of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination—a people’s
pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the
framework of an existing state.”); see also Borgen, supra note 25, at 9 (“[S]elfdetermination means the right to be free from external interference in its pursuit of
its political, economic, and social goals.”).
40. Vidmar, supra note 32, at 814.
41. See id. at 809 (“[I]n the absence of a relevant constitutional provision or
specific approval by a parent state, the question of secession is much more
disputable.”).
42. See James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to
Unilateral Secession, in SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: QUEBEC AND
LESSONS LEARNED 31, 32 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2000) (“Outside the colonial
context, the United Nations is extremely reluctant to admit a seceding entity to
membership against the wishes of the government of the state from which it has
purported to secede. There is no case since 1945 where it has done so.”).
43. See, e.g., Report Presented by the Council of the League by the Commission
of Rapporteurs, The Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations Council Doc. B7
(1921) [hereinafter Aaland Islands Report]; see also Reference re Succession of
Quebec, 2 S.C.R. at 277–78; Badinter Commission, supra note 31, at 1497–99.
44. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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even whether secession is within the scope of international
law.45 Most argue that secession falls foremost within the
auspices of domestic law rather than international law.46 The
use of domestic law to secure secession and independence is
termed “bilateral” secession. In practice, two things can together
justify bilateral secession: “a clear expression of democratic will”
by those wishing to secede,47 and negotiations between the
secessionists and the parent country.48 In this way, the parent
country grants independence in response to democratic
pressure, effectively justifying secession.
When the parent state is unwilling to negotiate, however,
the outcome is less clear. Certain historical cases indicate that a
second “unilateral”49 or “remedial”50 method of secession is
justified. The Aaland Islands Case in 192151 articulated the
following requirements for justifiable secession when the parent
state opposes it: 1) those wishing to secede were “a people”;52 2)
they were subject to serious violations of human rights at the
hands of the parent state; and 3) no other remedies were
available to them.53 The Supreme Court of Canada applied a

45. Borgen, supra note 27, at 485 (“[I]nternational law is silent as to secession,
which is viewed as a matter of domestic law and politics, not international law.”);
Special Comm. on European Affairs of the N.Y. City Bar, Executive Summary:
Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova, 14
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379, 383 (2008) [hereinafter Special Committee]
(“[I]nternational law has little to say as to any supposed ‘right’ to autonomy.”).
46. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 8; see also Special Committee, supra note 45,
at 383 (“[G]rants of ‘autonomy’ are largely issues of domestic law.”).
47. Reference re Succession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. at, at 264–65.
48. Id. at 265–66.
49. Id. at 264 (describing this form of attempted secession as “unilateral”).
50. See, e.g., Vidmar, supra note 32, at 814–18 (describing the form of
attempted secession as “remedial” when a parent state opposes it and is unwilling to
negotiate).
51. This case concerned a collection of islands that were historically under
Finnish control, through referendum, but sought to become Swedish. Aaland Islands
Report, supra note 43, at 21. In this case, the League of Nations concluded that, as
long as the people of the Aaland Islands were granted a measure of selfdetermination, they had no right to secede from Finland and be annexed by Sweden.
Id. at 29 (concluding that 1. the Aalanders deserve “protection and support” in their
status as an ethnic minority; 2. annexation is not the only option in this case; and 3.
the “Finnish State is ready to grant the inhabitants satisfactory guarantees and
faithfully to observe the engagement which it will enter into with them”).
52. The definition of “people” is somewhat ambiguous. See Vidmar, supra note
32, at 810–12. Nonetheless, “the term ‘people’ has been used to signify citizens of a
nation-state, the inhabitants in a specific territory being decolonized by a foreign
power, and ethnic groups.” Borgen, supra note 25, at 7–8.
53. Borgen, supra note 25, at 8.
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similar standard in its decision on the secession of the Province
of Quebec in 1998.54 If a state seeking independence can present
evidence of these factors, most commentators would argue it
likely has a basis for justifiable secession.55
Finally, the secessionists may attempt to secede by simply
declaring themselves independent from a parent state.56 This
occurs without a blessing from the parent state or justification
under the unilateral standard discussed above.57 Such de facto
secession is the most difficult to justify and may in fact be
unjustifiable.58 Some suggest that the only possibility for
justification in the case of de facto secession occurs through
recognition of the secessionists’ independence by other nations.59
This can be especially difficult because, as one commentator has
noted, it is not “easy to formulate any satisfactory test for
determining the statehood of the seceding entity before its
complete success.” That is, there is no way to analyze claims to
statehood until secessionists have successfully separated from
their parent state.60
E. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OBSCURE THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
SURROUNDING SECESSION
In practice, application of the legal theories of secession is
rarely as precise as each of the theories discussed above might
indicate. This is because, in addition to the legal considerations,
politics often gets involved.61 Given the often-unclear nature of

54. Reference re Succession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 281, 284–86 (Can.)
(laying out three requirements including that the seceding group are a “people,”
“governed as part of a colony, or subject to alien subjugation, domination or
exploitation,” and when it is deprived of “the meaningful exercise of its right to selfdetermination”).
55. See Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination:
“Selfistans,” Secession, and the Great Powers’ Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 137, 145–46
(2010) (discussing the current norms regarding unilateral, or remedial, secession).
56. See Vidmar, supra note 32, 818.
57. See id. at 817–18.
58. Cf. Reference re Succession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. at 296 (“[R]ecognition, even
if granted, would not, however, provide any retroactive justification for the act of
secession.”).
59. This, of course, presupposes a system that assigns significant legal weight
to acts of recognition, as in the constitutive theory of statehood. Id. (“The ultimate
success of such a secession would be dependent on recognition by the international
community.”).
60. Crawford, supra note 33, at 262.
61. See Sterio, supra note 55, at 140 (arguing that the current norm of external
self-determination “inappropriately mixes the legal with the political realms”).
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the legal principles of secession, and given the absence of any
governing international legal body,62 political incentives often
play a more significant role than legal norms in motivating
states to recognize seceding territories as independent states.63
The influence of politics on the legal issue of selfdetermination makes the successful exercise of this right more
difficult,64 and possibly arbitrary,65 for less influential nations.
There is evidence that, in practice, in addition to meeting the
legal requirements of secession, secessionists must also gain the
approval of a powerful nation in order for legitimacy.66 Some
argue that the problem with the latter step is that it depends
entirely on the will and motives of the powerful nation,67 as
opposed to the legal soundness of the secessionists’ claims to
self-determination.68 At least one commentator suggests that
this practice makes the sovereignty of less-powerful nations
slightly less important than that of more-powerful nations.69

62. Richard N. Haass, Pondering Primacy, 4 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 91, 92 (2003)
(“[T]here is no single source of authority or legitimacy . . . . [T]he United Nations is
not yet at the point where it alone can decide what is legitimate and what is not.”).
63. Sterio, supra note 55, at 170 (“Finally, the self-determination-seeking
people must prove that external actors, including the Great Powers, view its
struggle as legitimate and are ready to embrace it as a new sovereign power. I allege
that this ultimate criterion is the most important one, and that it routinely
determines the fate of various peoples struggling for the recognition of their rights
across the globe.”). Sterio uses the term “Great Powers” to refer to the “most
powerful nations.” See id. at 137.
64. Id. at 172 (“[I]f peoples are seeking to separate from a Great Power, as in
the case of Chechnya struggling to gain independence from Russia, their quest for
self-determination will most likely fail. . . . The Great Powers seem to be immune
from pressures of self-determination, and their borders are unlikely to yield to
secessionist movements.”).
65. Id. at 174 (arguing that strong nations will “choose to support [selfdetermination] . . . only when their own interests are served by such exercise of
external self-determination by a specific people”).
66. See id. at 173–74 (contrasting the situations of Kosovo and East Timor,
both of which had support from powerful nations as they seceded, with the
situations of Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, all of which currently are in
opposition with the interests of powerful nations).
67. Id. at 173 (“[I]t is the Great Powers’ support, or lack thereof, toward a
people’s struggle for self-determination that determines the outcome of such a
struggle.”).
68. See id. at 175 (“The legal criteria for the external self-determination have
become somewhat mooted by the necessity to obtain the political support of the
Great Powers for any struggling on our planet.”).
69. Id. (“[T]he rule by the Great Powers inherently undermines state equality
and the entire sovereignty-based system of global international relations.”).
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E. DEFERENCE TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
Though the right of self-determination is highly regarded
within international law, various international documents
attest to the fact that the right to territorial integrity is at least
as important a right—Article 2 of the United Nations Charter is
foremost among these documents.70 Though some commentators
have called for a relaxation of the current standards protecting
territorial integrity,71 the majority view defers to the existing
laws as codified in various international legal instruments.72
Related to the issue of territorial integrity is the principle of
uti possidetis juris: “The right to self-determination must not
involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of
independence.”73 The original purpose of this doctrine was to
maintain the borders of former colonies upon decolonization.74
The Badinter Commission, created in 1991 to find solutions for
the problems in the Balkans,75 utilized this doctrine in its
management of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia.76 In that
case, the Commission concluded that uti possidetis juris had a
broader meaning, implying that it also applied in instances of
70. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.”); see also, Vienna Convention on the Succession of
States in Respect of Treaties, pmbl., done Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S 3 (recalling
the territorial protections observed by the United Nations Charter); Declaration on
Friendly Relations, supra note 31, at art. 1 (“The territorial integrity and political
independence of the State are inviolable.”); Montevideo Convention, supra note 11,
at art. 11 (“[T]he territory of a state is inviolable.”).
71. See Thomas M. Franck, Opinion Directed at Question 2 of the Reference, in
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: QUEBEC AND LESSONS LEARNED 75,
82 (Anne Bayefsky ed., 2000) (arguing that the respect for territorial integrity is less
observed than the multitude of international legal instruments make it seem).
72. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 8 (“[T]erritorial integrity of states [is] a
cornerstone of the UN framework as stated in Article (2) of the Charter.”);
Orakhelashvili, supra note 35, at 288 (“If the policies consistently accepted as
fundamental by the international community, namely the principle of territorial
integrity of States, are violated on certain occasions under the pressure of political
will, they will, sooner or later, be violated on other occasions as well.”).
73. Malcolm N. Shaw, Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries, 8 EUR. J. OF
INT’L L. 478, 482 (1997).
74. For a broader discussion of uti possidetis juris, see Frontier Dispute (Burk.
Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565 (Dec. 22).
75. Richard Falk, Self-Determination Under International Law: The Coherence
of Doctrine Versus the Incoherence of Experience, in THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF
PEOPLES: COMMUNITY, NATION, AND STATE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 52
(Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber, ed. 2002).
76. See Badinter Commission, supra note 31, at 1498.
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self-determination unrelated to decolonization, as was the
situation in Yugoslavia.77
F. THE SEARCH FOR AN OBJECTIVE TEST OF STATE FAILURE
There are many conceptions of “state failure,” most of which
are derived from classical definitions of statehood.78 Most
commentators agree that failed states arise when a government
loses its ability to govern.79 Also important in the definition of a
failed state is the loss of its legitimacy.80 Some commentators
also emphasize the failed state’s inability to “sustain[ ] itself as a
member of the international community.”81
The study of failed states has produced a variety of tests
aimed at creating an objective test for determining “failure.” The
foci of these tests vary, but many emphasize the importance of
governmentally enforced security,82 including physical security
from violence83 and economic security.84 Only through security
77. See id. (“However, it is well established that, whatever the circumstances,
the right to self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the
time of independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the States concerned agree
otherwise.”).
78. See generally Jonathon Di John, Conceptualising the Causes and
Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature 3–10 (Crisis States
Research
Centre,
Working
Paper
No.
25,
2008),
available
at
http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/wp25.2.pdf (discussing the link
between the historical conceptions of Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Weber, and the
current analyses of failed states corresponding to the theories of those writers).
79. See I. William Zartman, Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse,
in COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE
AUTHORITY 1, 1 (I. William Zartman ed., 1995) (“[‘Failed State’] refers to a situation
where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have
fallen apart . . . . For a period, the state itself, as a legitimate, functioning order, is
gone.”).
80. Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and
Indicators, in STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF TERROR 1, 9
(Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2003).
81. Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, FOREIGN
POLICY, Winter 1992–93, at 3 (discussing the “disturbing new phenomenon [that] is
emerging: the failed nation-state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member
of the international community”).
82. See Rotberg, supra note 80, at 6; Di John, supra note 78, at 9 (citing Crisis
States Research Center, CRISIS STATES WORKSHOP (2006) available at
http://www.crisisstates.com/download/drc/FailedState.pdf);
Fund
for
Peace,
Methodology
Behind
CAST,
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=107&Itemid=145 (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
83. See Fund for Peace, supra note 82.
84. See Liana Sun Wyler, Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats
and U.S. Policy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, app. A (2007), available at
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB679.pdf (defining a failed state as one which is
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can a country gain political independence.85 And through
political independence comes strong leadership from a
legislative or executive power, both of which aid in stabilizing a
country.86 The existence of an independent judiciary87 and the
significance of the rule of law88 are also elements often
considered in tests for failure. Notably, at least one test includes
a time element—arguing that a state has failed only once a
power vacuum has existed for several years.89
G. THE HISTORY OF SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND’S PUSH FOR
SECESSION
Until 1960, Somaliland, a northern region of modern day
Somalia, was a colony under the British Empire.90 Five days
after Britain granted the colony independence91 it united with
the southern half of modern day Somalia,92 which had recently
gained independence from Italy.93 Political turmoil between
various clans and regions within the country tainted the
unification process.94 Nevertheless, a nationalistic fervor for a
“Greater Somalia” drove this effort onward.95 Over time, the
“unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of
its territory”).
85. See Rotberg, supra note 80, at 3; Fund for Peace, supra note 82.
86. See Fund for Peace, supra note 82.
87. See Rotberg, supra note 80, at 6; Fund for Peace, supra note 82.
88. See Rotberg, supra note 80, at 3; Fund for Peace, supra note 82.
89. See Di John, supra note 78, at 9–10 (discussing one formulation, a
requirement of which is that the authority of the government has been absent for
several years).
90. See Richard W. Rahn, Curious Case of Somaliland, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2005, at A16.
91. See id.
92. Said S. Samatar, Historical Setting, in SOMALIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 1, 26
(Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1992).
93. Id. at 20. Italy ruled the southern half of Somalia prior to World War II,
and though it maintained conditional control over the country after the war, it was
only temporary. By U.N. agreement, Italy controlled the region for only ten more
years until 1960, when it ceded full control to the Somali people. See id. at 14–15,
20.
94. See id. at 27 (citing the north’s concern over the democratic power of the
south, most clearly demonstrated by a constitutional referendum in 1961 which
passed but without a majority in the north).
95. See I.M. Lewis, Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism, 1 J. MOD. AFR. STUD.
147, 147–51 (1963) (discussing the cultural and historical impetus behind the efforts
for a unified Somalia); see also Samatar, supra note 92, at 28 (explaining that the
catalyst behind the movement for a “Greater Somalia” was the desire to protect
historical territorial integrity from the other newly independent colonies in the
region).
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infighting subsided somewhat, allowing for the establishment of
a functioning democratic government,96 and the northern and
southern regions of the country remained unified for the rest of
the 1960s.97
In 1969, however, General Mohammed Siad Barre
engineered a successful coup and became president, effectively
ending democratic rule.98 One of his aims was to inject
modernity into Somali society by replacing its traditional and
cultural underpinnings.99 His methods, described by some as an
amalgamation of Soviet orthodoxy and the teachings of the
Qur’an,100 and which he termed “scientific socialism,”101
included suppression of the ancient clan system,102 an emphasis
on central planning of the economy,103 and extreme violence
against opposition groups.104 Siad Barre maintained his grip
over the country through the 1980s, losing control only after the
commencement of the civil war that continues today.105
Because of the civil war that began in 1991 and continues
today, the conditions in Somalia are anarchic.106 At least one
study has listed the country at the top of the list of “failed
states.”107 There is virtually no government presence in the

96. See NINA J. FITZGERALD, SOMALIA: ISSUES, HISTORY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 34
(2002) (discussing the attribute of the Western style democracy that developed
throughout the early years of Somali independence, including high voter
participation rates and universal suffrage).
97. Rahn, supra note 90, at A16; see also Draper, supra note 1, at 76–77
(discussing indicators of the newly unified Somalia’s growing stability throughout
the 1960s, including political development, growth of its international ties, and
domestic self-reliance).
98. FITZGERALD, supra note 96, at 34–35.
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also ROBERT G. PATMAN, THE SOVIET UNION IN THE HORN OF
AFRICA: THE DIPLOMACY OF INTERVENTION AND DISENGAGEMENT 118 (1990).
101. See PATMAN, supra note 100, at 117–18.
102. FITZGERALD, supra note 96, at 34.
103. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD 1405 (Thomas M. Leonard
ed., 2006).
104. See Samatar, supra note 92, at 50–52 (describing the brutalities committed
by the Siad Barre regime against the opposition clans—the Majeerteen, the Isaaq
and the Hawiye—including various massacres (including of women and children),
mass rape, spoilage of natural resources, and immense destruction of personal
property).
105. Rahn, supra note 90, at A16.
106. See id.; Daniel Howden, Africa’s Best Kept Secret, INDEPENDENT (London),
May 6, 2006, at 22.
107. See generally The Fund for Peace, FAILED STATES INDEX 2009, available at
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/. Somalia has failed more significantly than even
Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, three of the most prominent recent examples of
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southern part of Somalia.108 Al-Qaeda-backed groups have
gained a foothold in the region and these groups perpetuate a
vicious cycle of instability in two ways. They suppress the
populace with daily violence,109 and use economic and religious
incentives to lure young Somali males into the only steady jobs
available—as foot soldiers in the civil war.110
The official government of Somalia, the Somali Transitional
Government,111 has no real control or influence over the day-today affairs of the country.112 Though the government controls
parts of Mogadishu,113 the rest of Somalia is controlled by clans,
pirates, and al-Shabaab,114 a fundamentalist Muslim terror
group.115 The Transitional Government receives financial
support from the United States and the African Union has
pledged financial and military aid.116 Nevertheless, much of this
aid remains undelivered and Somalia’s nearest neighbors are
reluctant to get involved in the instability.117
In the north, in Somaliland, however, the situation is
markedly different. Relative to the atmosphere of the rest of the
country, Somaliland is a portrait of stability.118 A few rocky
years after declaring their independence from Somalia in
1991,119 the northern clans came together, deciding to give up
violence and resolve the differences that had ignited under the
extreme state disaster. Id.
108. Howden, supra note 106, at 22.
109. See Draper, supra note 1, at 87.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 76.
112. Abdinasir Mohammed & Sarah Childress, Suicide Bombing Kills Somalia
Ministers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2009, at A11.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Al-Shabaab’s role in the stability of the country has evolved over the last
several years. In 2006 it acted as a governmentally sanctioned militia. Once that
government collapsed, al-Shabaab became a destabilizing force in the country,
responsible for multiple suicide bombings. As the current government has waned, alShabaab has again increased its influence in the country, perhaps even controlling
elements of the government. See id.; see also Somalia and Its Jihadists: A
Government under the Cosh, ECONOMIST, June 27, 2009, at 56.
116. Mohammed & Childress, supra note 112, at A11.
117. See Somalia and Its Jihadists, supra note 115, at 56 (“Kenya and Ethiopia
are loth to step in. . . . [T]he Shabab says it ‘will destroy the tall glass buildings in
Nairobi’ unless Kenya pulls its troops back from the border.”).
118. Draper, supra note 1, at 86.
119. Despite the declaration of independence, little has changed politically for
the region, especially as regards their position within the sphere of international
relations—though they do maintain some autonomy over their own affairs. See
Baldauf, supra note 7, at 6.
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Siad regime.120 Today, violence is rare.121 Somaliland has
engaged in efforts to combat the systemic instability in the
south.122 There are even signs of basic economic development in
the capital city of Hargeysa.123 Perhaps most importantly for the
long-term stability of the region, Somaliland observes a rough
form of Western-style democracy.124 Despite some lingering
problems,125 Somaliland has become a relatively stable,
autonomous region.126
Somaliland’s leaders actively promote its secession from
Somalia.127 They cite their region’s recent history of stability, its
democratic government, and the failure of the Somali state in
support of their claims.128 A few commentators have also argued
for Somaliland’s formal independence, both as a matter of law
and as a matter of international public policy.129 However,
120. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86.
121. Id.
122. See Trying to Behave like a Proper State, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 2005, at 43–44
(detailing the circumstances surrounding the arrest of seven al-Qaeda members for
a plot to assassinate “leaders and foreign aid workers”).
123. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86 (“Somaliland’s capital city of Hargeysa is an
almighty wreck of sledgehammered streets, ungoverned traffic, litter, and refugee
camps, but there are two things you will not find in Mogadishu . . . a construction
boom . . . [and] currency-exchange booths everywhere on the streets . . . .”).
124. See Baldauf, supra note 7, at 6; see also The Nation Nobody Knows, supra
note 9, at 42. Somaliland’s government has a bicameral legislature of sorts—the
upper house consists of clan elders and the lower of democratically elected
representatives. Id.; see also Howdens, supra note 106, at 22. In 2009, Somaliland
was due for its first presidential election since 2003, but disagreements have
postponed it several times. See Matt Brown, Somaliland Readies for Presidential
Election, NAT’L (Abu Dhabi), Oct. 20, 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091021/FOREIGN/710209864/1135.
125. Since October of 2008, as many as thirty suicide bombings (presumably
carried out by terror cells associated with al-Qaeda, such as al-Shabaab) have killed
several Somalilanders, challenging the stability of the region. See Al-Qaeda on the
March, ECONOMIST, May 23, 2009, at 48. Though the government is a functioning
democracy, it struggles with political corruption. See, e.g., Somaliland Stability
‘Under Threat,’ BBC NEWS, Oct. 8, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
8292773.stm (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) (“[T]he presidential election . . . was due to
have been held on 27 September. This is not the first time the vote has been
delayed . . . .”). Finally, certain human rights issues remain unresolved—for
instance, female genital mutilation affects as many as 95% of Somali women. U.N.
Children’s Fund [UNICEF], Advocacy Paper, Eradication of Female Genital
Mutilation
(2004),
available
at
http://www.unicef.org/somalia/
SOM_FGM_Advocacy_Paper.pdf.
126. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86.
127. Id. at 86–87.
128. See id. at 86; Baldauf, supra note 7, at 6; Howden, supra note 106, at 22.
129. See, e.g., Alison K. Eggers, Note, When is a State a State? The Case for the
Recognition of Somaliland, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 211, 222 (2007) (arguing
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though many countries maintain relationships with the region,
no country officially recognizes Somaliland’s existence
independent of Somalia.130
II. UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW,
SOMALILAND HAS NO CLAIMS TO INDEPENDENCE
A. MERELY SATISFYING THE REQUIREMENTS OF STATEHOOD IS
INADEQUATE TO JUSTIFY SECESSION
Some contend that Somaliland meets the requirements of
statehood, and that for this reason, is already independent of
Somalia.131 The legality of such a claim depends upon an
evaluation of the legal status of Somaliland using the
declarative or constitutive theory of statehood. The constitutive
theory of statehood requires recognition by other states and
international organizations, and the applicability of the
declarative theory is contingent upon several social,
geographical, and political factors.
1. The Constitutive Theory
Under the constitutive theory of statehood, Somaliland
could meet the requirements of statehood upon recognition of
independence by other nations or international bodies.132 It is
unclear how this theory would apply in practice to the case of
Somaliland. What actions are sufficient to indicate
recognition?133 What are the legal implications if some states
recognize a region but others refuse to offer recognition?134 How
that because Somaliland meets international legal standards for “statehood” it
should be recognized as a state); Poore, supra note 15, at 124 (arguing that
Somaliland might have never actually united with Somalia in the 1960s and
therefore can justifiably declare itself an independent state).
130. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86.
131. See Eggers, supra note 129, at 219–20.
132. See generally Poore, supra note 15, at 136 (discussing broadly the
requirements of the constitutive theory of statehood).
133. Worster, supra note 19, at 135 (“Even the practice of state recognition can
be opaque in terms of what acts may constitute recognition. Practice, in terms of
seeking legitimacy in either theory, evolves.”).
134. Compare id. at 168 (discussing the “classic constitutive theory,” which “says
that the state exists only upon recognition since it is a purely legal creation of rights
and obligations, yet the other states have no constraints on them in law in
recognizing the purported state”), with Vidmar, supra note 32, at 827–28 (arguing
that “the situation in which one state may be recognized by some states, but not by

380

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 19:2

much discretion do existing states have in their duty to
recognize other states?135 Despite differing views as to the
minimum requirements under the constitutive theory, even
under the most liberal standards of recognition, Somaliland’s
relationships with other nations are not significant enough to
constitute recognition. Currently, no nations or international
bodies formally recognize Somaliland’s statehood.136 They will
not interact with Somaliland as a sovereign state,137 nor will
they circumvent the Somali Transitional Government to
interact on a political level with the region.138 In short,
Somaliland is unable to engage in official relations with other
nations, who are concerned about the political ramifications of
recognizing a breakaway state.139
2. The Declarative Theory
Under the declarative theory of statehood, a region attains
statehood by declaring itself a state,140 by having a permanent
population, by having a defined territory, by having a
government, and by having the capacity to enter into relations
with other states.141 Considering each of these factors,

others, is an evident problem and thus a great deficiency of the constitutive theory”).
135. Compare Worster, supra note 19, at 153 (discussing the argument
defending state discretion, stating that that “there is no reason why it should be
unacceptable for states to ignore other purported states”), with CRAWFORD, supra
note 33, at 23 (emphasizing the importance of recognition–that “it might be argued
that recognition . . . is central rather than peripheral . . . .”).
136. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86.
137. Id. (“[N]o government has recognized [Somaliland] as a sovereign nation.”);
The Nation Nobody Knows, supra note 9, at 42.
138. See The Nation Nobody Knows, supra note 9, at 42 (“Saudi Arabia . . . is
firm friends with the transitional government in Somalia, which maintains that
Somaliland remains within its orbit.”); Abdullahi Del, Letter to the Editor, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2005, at A16 (discussing reasons why the United States is interested
in supporting the aims of the Somali Transitional Government: “[T]he government of
Somalia is very aggressive in supporting Western standards in all phases of
governance, economic development and fighting terrorism. Somalia is strategically
located and has the strategic resources and desire to become a great friend to the
United States.”); Howden, supra note 106, at 22 (“The UK recognised Somaliland at
independence in 1960 but London would have to upset powerful allies to renew that
step.”).
139. See Rahn, supra note 90, at A16.
140. Poore, supra note 15, at 136; see also Huang, supra note 10, at 126–27;
Montevideo Convention, supra note 11, at art. 3.
141. See Montevideo Convention, supra note 11, at art. 1; Carsten Thomas
Ebenroth & Matthew James Kemner, The Enduring Political Nature of Questions of
State Succession and Secession and the Quest for Objective Standards, 17 U. PA. J.
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Somaliland has a colorable argument that it meets the
theoretical requirements of statehood. Somaliland’s population
is relatively stable, unlike in the south, which has suffered a
steady exodus of refugees since the civil war began.142
Somaliland’s borders from its days as a British colony still serve
as a hypothetical line of demarcation, albeit informally and
without legal effect because of its unification with Somalia in
1960.143 Somaliland can point to the relative success of several
peaceful local elections as evidence of the existence of
government.144 Finally, as previously discussed, although no
nation recognizes Somaliland, it still maintains some informal
contacts with other nations.145 On these bases, Somaliland
appears to have a strong claim to statehood.
At least one commentator on the issue of Somaliland’s
independence has argued that because it meets the
requirements of the declarative theory, Somaliland deserves
independence.146 However, it is one thing to suggest that a
region satisfies theoretical requirements of statehood, but quite
another to argue that this constitutes a legal basis for
independence. There is no legal precedent indicating that the
four requirements of statehood are a prima facie basis for

INT’L ECON. L. 753, 807–08 (1996) (“At times, the United Nations has admitted as
members and the international community has recognized states that failed to meet
each of the four characteristics. Nevertheless, compliance with these factors is
usually required for statehood.”).
142. See Steve Bloomfield, Somalia War-Refugee Crisis Surpasses Darfur in its
Horror, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 22, 2007, at 34 (discussing the impact of the
refugee crisis in Somalia—estimating that as many as 600,000 people have fled from
the capital city of Mogadishu).
143. Somaliland’s most notable border dispute is with the neighboring region of
Puntland, a region that also wishes to break away from Somalia. They disagree as to
the location of the border between them. See Somalia’s Puntland Sold Exploration
Rights in Somaliland, AFROL NEWS, Feb. 1, 2006, available at
http://www.afrol.com/articles/17937 (discussing contracts that Puntland granted to
foreign companies for mineral exploration on soil that Somaliland claims as its own).
144. See Baldauf, supra note 7, at 6; The Nation Nobody Knows, supra note 9, at
42. For example, in 2003 the country held a peaceful presidential election in which
the margin of victory was only eighty votes. Rahn, supra note 90, at A16.
145. See, e.g., Eggers, supra note 129, at 219; The Nation Nobody Knows, supra
note 9, at 42. The government of Ethiopia has invited officials in the Somaliland
government to attend celebrations for the 105th anniversary of the establishment of
Ethiopia’s second capital, Diredawa. See Ethiopia Invites Somaliland Parliament
TIMES,
Nov.
28,
2009,
available
at
Leaders,
SOMALILAND
http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/2009/409/3.shtml.
146. See Eggers, supra note 129, at 222 (“Somaliland has operated as an
independent state for fifteen years and as it meets international legal standards for
‘statehood’ is, in fact, a state.”).
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independence. Such a precedent would be disastrous to the idea
of state sovereignty.147 Any region the least bit dissatisfied with
its government and able to meet the requirements of the
declarative theory of statehood could legally declare
independence from its parent state.148 If there is a legal
justification for Somaliland’s independence from Somalia, it
cannot be simply because it meets the four theoretical
requirements and it declares its statehood.
B. THE SCOPE OF SOMALILAND’S RIGHT TO EXERCISE SELFDETERMINATION
The proponents of independence for Somaliland argue for a
broad construction of the right to self-determination—that is,
that the people of Somaliland should have a right to form a
country independent of Somalia.149 The first justification that
Somaliland might claim lies in its history as a British colony. A
colony has a legal right to exercise self-determination
independent of its colonizer.150 Some make the argument that
Somaliland, as a former colony, may exercise its right to selfdetermination because it has not yet done so, despite gaining
independence in 1960.151 When Somaliland joined Somalia in
1960 to create a “Greater Somalia,” there was no national
referendum or popular vote on the matter.152 Because there was
no national vote, proponents of this position contend that
unification of the north and south parts of Somalia was
invalid.153 “If there was no union, then Somaliland still exists as
an independent entity, and discussions pertaining to secession
147. See generally Huang, supra note 10, at 111–12 (discussing, within the
context of Taiwan’s statehood efforts, the requirements of statehood, including the
additional “indispensible” requirement of sovereignty).
148. For example, a U.S. state like Minnesota meets the requirements of
statehood under the declarative theory: it has a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and could reasonably enter into relations with other
nations, if other nations opted to recognize Minnesota’s statehood. Under that logic,
Minnesota could legally declare its independence from the United States. Cf. Huang,
supra note 10, at 112 (discussing “exclusive sovereignty and the legal right to govern
a territory under international law” as the factors that lend legitimacy to claims of
statehood).
149. See generally Poore, supra note 15, at 146–47 (arguing that in Somaliland’s
case, the burden of justifying unilateral self-determination is lower).
150. See Declaration of Friendly Relations, supra note 31, at 124; Epstein, supra
note 37, at 135–36.
151. See Poore, supra note 15, at 140–42.
152. Id. at 140–41; see also Samatar, supra note 92, at 26.
153. See Poore, supra note 15, at 140.
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are moot.”154
Several problems call this argument into question. It
ignores the fact that Somaliland and Somalia did formally agree
to unite in 1960; though there was no national vote on the issue,
democratically elected leaders of each former colony oversaw the
unification process.155 These leaders did not act contrary to the
will of the people. Rather, they acted in response to a surge of
Somali nationalism and anti-colonialism in both the northern
and southern parts of the country.156 Even if we accept the
argument that the unification of 1960 is invalid because it
lacked a popular referendum, this argument overlooks the
decade following unification in which both the northern and
southern parts of Somalia existed together as a relatively stable
and vibrant democracy.157 The two decades under the Siad
Barre regime were far from tranquil. The entire country, the
north as well as the south, was oppressed by this brutal
regime.158 The fact that the country faced oppression during this
period should have no bearing on whether it actually unified
upon decolonization. Because the north and south freely united
upon independence, the argument that Somaliland retains the
right to exercise self-determination is tenuous.
The second way that Somaliland could exercise its right to
self-determination is through internal self-determination, by
using Somalia’s established political procedures and
mechanisms of self-rule to realize its policy goals. The
circumstances in Somalia, however, make it difficult for
154. Id.
155. See generally Samatar, supra note 92, at 25–28 (discussing the
development of democracy in the united Somalia throughout the 1960s, including
the adoption of universal suffrage, the formation of governmental organizations, and
a lively political culture). Id. at 26 (“In April 1960, leaders of the two territories met
in Mogadishu and agreed to form a unitary state.”).
156. Id. at 25–26 (“Political protests forced Britain in 1956 to introduce
representative government in its protectorate and to accept the eventual unification
of British Somaliland with southern Somalia . . . . Popular demand compelled the
leaders of the two territories to proceed with plans for immediate unification.”);
Draper, supra note 1, at 78 (“In 1960 the colonial powers departed, and a dreamy
nationalism seized the Somali people. With visions of a unified country, Somaliland
and Somalia confederated.”).
157. See Samatar, supra note 92, at 26.
158. See generally id. at 48–49 (discussing the repressive actions of the Said
Barre regime against the clans of Somalia). One might argue that, under the Siad
Barre regime, Somaliland had no choice but to be part of Somalia. This argument,
however, overlooks the entire decade of the 1960s, before Siad Barre came to power,
in which the country was, for the most part, a relatively peaceful Western-style
democracy. Id. at 26.

384

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 19:2

Somaliland to exercise internal self-determination. In fact, any
region within a failed state may have little or no opportunity to
petition its government in the furtherance of self-determination,
simply because it lacks a functioning government. In the case of
Somalia, because of the civil war and the political turbulence it
has caused, Somaliland has had no opportunity to use the
Somali political process since 1991 when the civil war began.159
Some commentators argue that Somaliland’s inability to
exercise internal self-determination is strong enough support for
the claim that Somaliland has the right to separate from
Somalia.160 Somaliland is entitled to independence, they argue,
because, as a failed state, its claim is distinguishable from other
secessionist claims.161 Under existing legal norms, this
argument is insufficient—there is a difference between a right
to self-determination and a broad right to independence.162
Some commentators even suggest that the apparatus of internal
self-determination may act as an “organizing principle” within a
failed state, giving citizens—with assistance from the
international community—the control and authority to bring
order out of the chaos within their country163 as opposed to

159. See generally Draper, supra note 1, at 78 (“In 1991 militias . . . chased
[General Siad] Barre out of Mogadishu. The Somali people, weary of occupiers and
strongmen, awaited the next iteration of government. Eighteen years later, they are
still waiting.”). It is important to note that the government of a state may not take
away the right to internal self-determination. See Sterio, supra note 55, at 145–46
(discussing the primary importance of the right to internal self-determination and
suggesting that an argument for secession becomes much stronger if the parent
state fails to grant the right to internal self-determination).
160. Poore, supra note 15, at 143 (“In fact, Somalilanders have been irreversibly
deprived of their right to internal self-determination and should not be forced to
remain shackled to the failed state of Somalia.”).
161. Id. (“Proponents believe Somaliland’s case is distinguishable from the
overwhelming majority of secessionist claims . . . .”).
162. See Nicola Bunick, Note, Chechnya: Access Denied, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 985,
1013–14 (2009) (“As a result, the Chechens, like all ‘people’ are entitled to internal
self-determination. However, a right to internal self-determination is far from a
right to independence, or even autonomy. It is merely the threshold requirement for
consideration of more sweeping entitlements.”).
163. See Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New
Internal Focus?, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 733, 756 (1995) (reviewing YVES BEIGBEDER,
INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND NATIONAL
ELECTIONS: SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (1994))
(discussing the organization that mechanisms of internal self-determination can
provide a failed state with the help of the international community; through “a
combination of peace among the warring factions, establishment of democratic
processes, guarantees of non-interference, and economic aid[, a failed state] can
ensure that they may begin to function in a meaningful way as autonomous political
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giving them the power to separate when times get tough.164
Moreover, the government of Somalia did not single out the
people of Somaliland in order to deny them the right to selfdetermination. Because of the lack of an effective government,
no citizen of Somalia has had a particularly effective way to
practice internal self-determination since the beginning of the
civil war. The region of Puntland, located in northern Somalia
on the tip of the Horn of Africa, also declared itself independent
of the government of Somalia in 1998.165 If an entire country is
denied the right to internal self-determination, can the entire
country break away from itself? Though international law is
largely silent on the issue of self-determination in the case of
failed states, in light of the deference shown to territorial
integrity in international law,166 it seems inconsistent to suggest
a solution in which a country somehow separates from itself, or,
the more likely result, fragments into several regions asserting
a right to independence.
C. SOMALILAND LACKS A LEGAL BASIS FOR SECESSION
Finally, the people of Somaliland might choose to exercise
their right to self-determination by opting to secede from
Somalia. Perhaps Somaliland’s best legal argument for
independence in the furtherance of self-determination arises
under one of the three legal theories of secession—bilateral,
unilateral (“remedial”), or de facto. However, under the current
circumstances in Somalia, even the theories regarding secession
provide an inadequate argument for Somaliland independence.
1. Bilateral Secession
Under the theory of bilateral secession, the primary aim is
cooperation between the party seeking independence and the

societies.”).
164. This is not to suggest that international law requires Somaliland to use
internal self-determination to work for peace in the south; this would be impractical,
and a heavy burden to place upon a region that struggles to maintain its own peace.
165. See Bay, supra note 1; see also Hassan Barise, Somali Warlords Battle for
Puntland, BBC NEWS, May 7, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1972557.stm.
Unfortunately, though Puntland operates somewhat autonomously of Mogadishu, it
still suffers from near-anarchic conditions. Two problems contribute to this:
Puntland’s border tensions with Somaliland and the prevalence of maritime piracy.
See Bay, supra note 1.
166. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 8; Orakhelashvili, supra note 35, at 288.

386

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 19:2

parent state.167 Bilateral secession has two requirements. First,
Somali domestic law would need to make some provision for
secession—whether through adoption of legislation specifically
allowing it or some other method. Second, Somaliland would
need to engage in “principled negotiations” with the Somali
government on the issue of secession.168 Theoretically,
Somalilanders could negotiate with the Transitional
Government and make a political push for legislation granting
secession. Currently, however, there are two obvious,
insurmountable barriers to any efforts at bilateral secession.
First, the current state of lawlessness in the country precludes
such political or legislative action; and second, even if that were
not the case, the Somali government is not favorable to the idea
of a breakup of the country.169
2. Unilateral Secession
The theory of unilateral secession requires three elements:
that the Somalilanders are a “people,” that the Somali
government subjected them to serious human rights violations,
and that no other viable options exist.170 There is, however, little
evidence to support such a claim. As to the requirement that the
citizens of Somaliland be a common people, the population of
Somaliland consists largely of members of the Isaaq clan.171 The
Isaaq, however, are not an ethnic or cultural minority; rather,
they are one of the larger clans in Somalia, along with the

167. Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 264–67 (Can.)
(discussing the efforts that the secessionist movement in Quebec would need to take
to successfully gain independence, including a national referendum, addressing the
interests of the provinces and the federal government, and addressing the rights of
minorities).
168. See id. at 273 (discussing the issue of secession in light of Quebec, stating
that it cannot be accomplished without principled negotiations with other
participants in the Confederation within the existing constitutional framework).
169. See Del, supra note 138, at A16 (“It should be noted that Somaliland was
never intended to be ‘independent’ from Somalia.”).
170. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 8.
171. United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Somalia:
Somali Government Policy Towards the Isaaq Clan, Somalia, Jan. 9, 1998, available
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3df0bbc14.html (stating that the Isaaq clan
“make up 80 percent of the former British Somaliland.”); see also Samatar, supra
note 92, at 50 (“The Isaaq as a clan-family occupy the northern portion of the
country [Somaliland]. Three major cities are predominantly, if not exclusively,
Isaaq: Hargeysa, the second largest city in Somalia . . . Burao in the interior . . . and
the port of Berbera.”).

2010]

SOMALILAND AND JUSTIFIED SECESSION

387

Hawiye, Darod, Dir, and Rahanweyn.172
In nearly all cases of successful secession (and even in many
recent unsuccessful ones) the party who argued for
independence was an ethnic minority.173 The most prominent
recent case is that of Kosovo, which has arguably been a
successful secession thus far.174 In that case, the people seceding
were ethnic Albanians, a minority in Serbia.175 Another example
is South Ossetia’s recent attempts to gain independence from
Georgia. The people of South Ossetia claim that: “South
Ossetians are ethnically distinct from Georgians and have
comprised a semi-autonomous community within Georgia for
seven hundred years.”176 In these and other cases, those seeking
independence are a distinct minority.177 This is not the case in
Somaliland. The Isaaq clan, which makes up a large portion of
the population in Somaliland, is not a significant minority
within Somalia as a whole, nor are they sufficiently distinct—
ethnically, culturally, or religiously—from the rest of the Somali
population to constitute a “people.”178
172. Draper, supra note 1, at 78.
173. Kosovo is the most prominent example of successful secession—ethnic
Albanians within a country of Serbs. Borgen, supra note 25, at 3. South Ossetia and
Abkhazia are both ethnic minorities within Georgia, and both wish to secede. Id. at
4–5. Cf. Special Comm., supra note 45, at 389 (discussing the Transnistrian
secessionists, who are ethnically Ukrainian, as is a significant portion of the rest of
Moldova).
174. The success of Kosovo’s secession is arguably dependent on a case on the
issue currently before the International Court of Justice, brought by Serbia, who
contests the secession. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of
Kosovo (Req. for Advisory Op.) (Order of Oct. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=21&case=141&code=kos&p3=0
(last visited Feb. 22, 2010); see also Bing Bing Jia, The Independence of Kosovo: A
Unique Case of Secession?, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 27, 42 (2009). This case poses a
problem for the countries who have already announced their position in the Kosovo
matter—recognition or non-recognition—because by taking a side while “the issue
was a pending matter before the ICJ . . . could be seen by many as flouting the
prerogatives” of the ICJ. Borgen, supra note 25, at 16.
175. Borgen, supra note 25, at 3 (describing the ethnic Albanian population as
the majority in Kosovo, but a minority within Serbia).
176. Id. at 4.
177. In the case of Abkhazia, as in the case of South Ossetia, the citizens are
mostly ethnic Russians, within a country that has an ethnically Georgian majority.
Borgen, supra note 25, at 20. “South Ossetia and Abkhazia are breakaway provinces
within the former Soviet republic of Georgia. These two provinces have functioned as
de facto states in recent years.” Sterio, supra note 55, at 167–68. See also Reference
re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 261–63 (Can.) (discussing the protection
of minorities).
178. Draper, supra note 1, at 78 (“According to the great Somali ethnographer,
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Second, we look to the issue of human rights. Under the
oppressive reign of Siad Barre, the Isaaq were certainly victims
of atrocity at the hands of the Somali government.179 During the
1980s, when the abuses of the Siad Barre regime were at their
peak, the government destroyed the Isaaq’s land and cities, and
committed widespread murder and rape.180 The Isaaq, however,
were not the only clan subjected to the cruelty of the Somali
government. The situation was nearly identical for the members
of the Majeerteen181 and the Hawiye182 clans. The common
thread running through the persecution of each of the clans was
their opposition, often violent, of the Siad Barre regime.183
Despite the severity of the human rights abuses perpetrated
against the Isaaq, it is unclear whether they are sufficiently
significant to support an argument in favor of justified
unilateral secession. For example, in the case of Kosovo, the
Serbian abuses gave rise to the term “ethnic cleansing,”184 and
on that basis is distinguishable from the case of Somaliland.185
Other examples of alleged human rights violations committed
against secessionist groups provide little guidance in
determining a workable test for justification of unilateral
secession.186 Historically, as in the case of Kosovo, the human

I.M. Lewis, Somalia’s occupants ‘form one of the largest single ethnic blocks in
Africa.’”).
179. See Samatar, supra note 92, at 51.
180. See id. (“An estimated 5,000 Isaaq were killed between May 27 and the end
of December 1988. About 4,000 died in the fighting, but 1,000, including women and
children, were alleged to have been bayoneted to death.”).
181. Id. at 50. The Majeerteen are a sub-clan of the Darod clan. WORLD BANK,
CONFLICT IN SOMALIA: DRIVERS AND DYNAMICS (2005), fig. A–1, at 55.
182. Samatar, supra note 92, at 51.
183. See id. at 49–50 (detailing the efforts of these three clans against the
government, including an attempted coup d’état by the Majeerteen and the military
campaigns of the Isaaq-led Somali National Movement).
184. Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, Statement Recognizing Kosovo as
Independent State (Feb. 18, 2008), available at http://www.america.gov/st/
texttrans-english/2008/February/20080218150254bpuh5.512637e-02.html
(citing
“the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo” as support
for U.S. recognition of Kosovo as an independent state). For a discussion of the
meaning of “ethnic cleansing,” see Alberto Costi, The 60th Anniversary of the
Genocide Convention, 39 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 831, 838 (2009) (“[Ethnic
cleansing] involves forcefully removing groups of people from an area, to create an
ethnically homogenous zone. This can involve considerable force and terror tactics
that, prima facie, could provide a basis for a finding of genocide.”).
185. See Rice, supra note 184 (“The unusual combination of factors found in the
Kosovo situation . . . are not found elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo a special
case. Kosovo cannot be seen as a precedent for any situation in the world today.”).
186. In Moldova, for example, the as-yet unsuccessful separatist Transnistrians
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rights violations perpetrated against a people must be more
severe than those faced by the Isaaq in order to justify
unilateral secession.187
Finally, if any other remedies exist, Somaliland must resort
to such remedies before seceding.188 It may be difficult to
envision paths that Somaliland might take to hasten peace in
the south, especially given its own tenuous grip on stability. The
region might push for independence through a national
referendum similar to the one of 1960, or suggest a form of
federalism and decentralization to gain at least an element of
autonomy from the Transitional Government in Mogadishu.
Nevertheless, even if other options open to Somaliland are
infeasible, it does not meet the other elements of the test. To
meet the test, Somaliland must fulfill all the requirements. It
fails the first two requirements, and, arguably, it also fails the
third. They are not a “people” according to the accepted
definition: an ethnic or cultural minority.189 They have arguably
not faced the types of human rights violations that can justify
secession.190 They may have other possible remedies, short of
secession.191

cite “a lack of due process, persecution of religious minorities, and retaliation
against political dissenters,” and the 1000 deaths in the 1992 war as a basis for their
claims of secession. See Special Committee, supra note 45, at 384 (arguing that “the
events of the 1992 War in and of themselves do not make a persuasive claim of
secession as a legal right. If they did, the world would be rife with secessionist
conflicts”). On the other hand, in the case of South Ossetia, whose independence only
Russia and Nicaragua recognize, it is unclear whether the Georgians or the South
Ossetians were the first to use force during the secession efforts. See Borgen, supra
note 25, at 5–6.
187. The common understanding of human rights violations encompasses more
than just infringement of physical security. Equally important are political, social,
and economic rights. See Kenneth A. Bollen, Political Rights and Political Liberties
in Nations: An Evaluation of Human Rights Measures, 1950 to 1984, 8 HUM. RTS. Q.
567, 567 (1986). The only clear case of what constitutes sufficiently severe human
rights violations, however, is the case of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. See Borgen,
supra note 25, at 11.
188. See Special Comm., supra note 45, at 384.
189. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 7–8.
190. See, e.g., id. at 11.
191. Some argue that federalism is an antidote to secession and other forms of
dissolution. See MALCOM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL
IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 51 (2008) (arguing that a federal system allows
decentralization of decision-making power, which may give secessionists sufficient
autonomy and allow the country to avoid dissolution). Nevertheless, it seems
impractical to suggest that a failed state like Somalia has the capacity to implement
such a structural change. For a discussion of other issues arising out of the question
of federalism and secession, see WAYNE J. NORMAN, NEGOTIATION NATIONALISM:
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3. De Facto Secession
On one hand one might argue that, since 1991, Somaliland
has already gained independence through de facto secession. De
facto secession on its own, however, is legally insufficient.192
Somaliland may have a better argument for legal de facto
secession if foreign nations recognized their independence, but
no state has done so.193 What if other nations did recognize
Somaliland? Some have held that de facto secession becomes
acceptable if enough nations recognize the seceding state.194 If
this view were the legal standard guiding secession, however, it
would harm both the separatists and the states from which they
secede.195
At the most basic level, the argument for the legality of
secession emphasizes the right of self-determination; it
emphasizes the autonomy of individuals and communities. But
if secession efforts depend upon recognition by foreign powers,
the focus shifts away from the interests of the people seeking to
exercise self-determination and onto the interests of the nations
who may or may not opt to recognize them.196 Foreign
governments will—quite understandably—look to their own
interests first when considering whether to extend recognition,
rather than examining the legal sufficiency of the secession
claim.197 Recognition, therefore, would depend on what the
recognizing state might get out of the deal, rather than what is
most beneficial to the people seeking recognition.198 Moreover, it
NATION-BUILDING, FEDERALISM, AND SECESSION IN THE MULTINATIONAL STATE 178–
79 (2006).
192. See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 217, 296 (Can.)
(stating that recognition is not a “retroactive justification” for secession).
193. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86.
194. See id. at 296 (“The ultimate success of such a [de facto] secession would be
dependent on recognition by the international community, which is likely to consider
the legality and legitimacy of secession having regard to, amongst other facts, the
conduct of Quebec and Canada, in determining whether to grant or withhold
recognition.”).
195. See Worster, supra note 19, at 150–51 (“One problem that unlimited
discretion may pose is that it can be manipulated for political ends and may provide
a vehicle for more dominant states to control less powerful ones through the
overarching goal of promoting security.”).
196. For more discussion of this issue, see Poore, supra note 15, at 136 and
Worster, supra note 19, at 149–51.
197. Worster, supra note 19, at 120–21 (“Larger, more powerful states that are
secure in their recognition may use recognition as a tool for their continued
domination of other states.”).
198. See id. The most overt recent display of self-interested recognition was by
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is unlikely that de facto secession through recognition could
even lead to a meaningful legal standard. Because of their
competing self-interests, if recognizing nations differ over
whether to extend recognition, it would likely be unclear
whether the number of recognizing states was sufficient to
justify secession.199 Furthermore, because recognition does not
depend on the merits of the secessionists’ claim to independence,
but on the recognizing state, the rationale may appear arbitrary
and provide no guidance for future cases.200
Such a legal standard also implicates the rights of the
parent state. International law gives great deference to state
sovereignty.201 If other nations, through the act of recognition,
hold the power to give or to withhold the right to secession, the
parent state’s right to sovereignty becomes subject to the caprice
of recognizing nations.202 A parent state has the right to declare
secession illegal under domestic law—but other states would
render that law worthless by recognizing a seceding region.
Such a standard might imply that international law takes
precedence over a sovereign state’s domestic law—when, in
reality, the opposite is true, especially as the law relates to the
issue of secession.203 States also have a right to preservation of
their existing borders.204 Both the rights to territorial integrity
Nauru. This economically depressed island country in the Pacific Ocean received $50
million from Russia in return for recognizing Abkhazia as independent of Georgia.
See Ellen Barry, A Tiny New Partner for Abkhazia, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 16,
2009, at 3.
199. This is one of the reasons why Kosovo’s case is in front of the ICJ. In that
case, recognition has proved to be an obscure standard. See generally Borgen, supra
note 25, at 15–16.
200. Cf. Sterio, supra note 55, at 171–73 (discussing the “Great Powers’”
decisions to support or oppose secessionist movements).
201. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (enjoining member states to “refrain
. . . from the threat or use of force against the . . . political independence of any
state”).
202. Dr. Raju G.C. Thomas, Nationalism, Secession, and Conflict: Legacies from
the Former Yugoslavia, Paper presented at the 1st Annual Association for Study of
Nationalities
Convention
(April
26–28,
1996),
available
at
http://www.srpska-mreza.com/MAPS/Ethnic-groups/Self-Determination.html
(“[N]ew state recognition policy proved to be an inventive method of destroying longstanding sovereign independent states. When several rich and powerful states
decide to take a sovereign independent state apart through the policy of recognition,
how is this state supposed to defend itself?”).
203. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 8; see also Special Comm., supra note 45, at
383 (“[G]rants of ‘autonomy’ are largely issues of domestic law.”).
204. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
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and state sovereignty suffer if recognition is an adequate
remedy to illegal secession.
The future of Somaliland’s attempts to secede from Somalia,
therefore, seems bleak. Though it is relatively stable, no country
recognizes it as independent of Somalia.205 Nor is it of any help
that the current principles of international law that speak to
Somaliland’s situation—the legal basis for statehood, the right
to self-determination, justifications for secession, the strong
respect for the integrity of national borders—establish a high
threshold for secession. Under international law, Somaliland
likely lacks justification to secede. This attests to a need for an
expansion of the law of secession, to accommodate regions like
Somaliland, who may not secede from Somalia, but who are also
denied self-determination because of the failure of the Somali
government.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATED TO SECESSION
SHOULD BE BROADENED TO ENCOMPASS
SECESSIONIST EFFORTS WITHIN FAILED STATES
Under current international law, aspiring secessionists
must overcome a high threshold to justify their actions. There
are several reasons for such a high bar. First, if the standards
were looser and justification for secession easier to attain, state
sovereignty would suffer.206 Because the legality of secession is
primarily an issue of domestic law,207 it would frustrate Somali
law to allow Somaliland to secede absent any recognized
compelling justification to do so. In the case of Somaliland, no
such justification exists. In the prototypical case of international
law circumventing domestic law as it pertains to secession, the
inhabitants of Kosovo were both an ethnic minority within
Serbia and were subject to ethnic cleansing by the Serb
government.208 The Somalilanders can claim neither.209 Finally,
Purposes of the United Nations.”).
205. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86.
206. See Brock Lyle, Note, Blood for Oil: Secession, Self-Determination, and
Superpower Silence in Cabinda, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 701, 707 (2005)
(“[T]oo broad a definition of self-determination makes it impossible to keep countries
together. Therefore, the threshold for secession based on self-determination should
be very high to avoid fractionalization based on minor divergences of interest.”).
207. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 8.
208. See id. at 3–4.
209. Though the clans of Somaliland were subjected to violence under the Barre
regime, the clans in southern Somalia faced similar abuses that, in some cases, were
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some argue that other nations might justify Somaliland’s
secession by recognizing its statehood.210 The principle of
justified secession through recognition does not help
Somaliland. No nation has formally recognized Somaliland,211
nor would recognition make for a reliable legal standard.212 Selfinterest would motivate the recognizing nations, creating a
situation in which competing incentives define the legal
standard.213 Such a standard lacks consistency and would be
difficult to apply coherently. Under current legal standards,
Somaliland cannot justifiably become an independent state.
This has dubious implications for the future of Somaliland.
It is, effectively, in political limbo. No outside government will
interact with it on a formal level.214 Practically, Somalilanders
cannot even appeal to their own government.215 Because they
have no practical legal recourse, the people of Somaliland are
bound to the anarchy of Somalia. An entire generation of
Somalilanders does not know life apart from civil war.216 Most
importantly, the people of Somaliland are not responsible for the
current state of the country. The clans of Somaliland settled
their grievances in the mid-1990s.217 The current violence stems
directly from the absence of an effective government in
Mogadishu in the south.218 Somaliland, and more broadly, any
stable region within a failed state, is condemned to the
even worse. See Samatar, supra note 92, at 48–52 (describing Barre’s “repressive
measures” against various clans including his command that the Red Berets
massacre civilians in the Hawiye region which is located in the south central portion
of Somalia).
210. See generally Vidmar, supra note 32, at 827–28.
211. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86.
212. See Vidmar, supra note 32, at 827–28 (“[T]he situation in which one state
may be recognized by some states, but not by others, is an evident problem and thus
a great deficiency of the constitutive theory.”).
213. See Sterio, supra note 55, at 172–73.
214. See The Nation Nobody Knows, supra note 9, at 42 (explaining that
Somalilanders are “dangerously reliant on the goodwill of neighbours, and of aid
donors who slip it money unofficially without the usual host-donor government
contracts”).
215. The first question that Somalilanders might ask if they were encouraged to
appeal to the Somali government would be: how, and to what effect? The Somali
Transitional Government is besieged by clans and al-Shabaab and powerless even
within Mogadishu. See Mohamed, supra note 112, at A11.
216. See Draper, supra note 1, at 76.
217. See id. at 86.
218. See Howden, supra note 106, at 22 (explaining that “when Barre’s
government fell in 1991, the north set up its own government within the former
colonial borders while the south descended into warlordism” and that “Mogadishu
. . . is now among the most dangerous places on earth”).
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uncertainty and lawlessness stemming from a toothless
government, which confines and limits its blameless
inhabitants.219
For this reason, the international law of statehood and
secession should be broadened to fill the analytical void
pertaining to secession in the case of a failed state. Two issues
are important: the interests of states in preserving state
sovereignty and the right of people to exercise selfdetermination. Currently, the people in a failed state have no
hope of exercising their right to self-determination and are
condemned to failure if the state lacks the stabilizing hand of an
effective government or if other justifications for selfdetermination or secession do not apply. The law must provide a
correction for this error. It would be equally dangerous,
however, to shift the balance too far in the opposite direction. If
the law legitimizes the right to self-determination to the
detriment of state sovereignty, it renders impotent the domestic
laws and the traditional rights of states.220 The state again
becomes burdened by an effectually powerless government, just
as it is in the opposite extreme. Any broadening of the law to
accommodate secessionist efforts within a failed state requires
narrow tailoring to bring these interests into equipoise.
To create this balance, a reformed test must include two
general requirements. The parent state must have failed,
according to an objective standard for failure. Likewise, the
secessionist region within the country must exhibit the opposite
attributes—demonstrating that it can govern itself where the
parent state has failed. In light of the need to balance the
interests of people with those of states, and in the spirit of the
methodologies of various organizations that evaluate the failure
of states,221 the test must make a fact-specific analysis of the
essential factors defining failed states.
Most failed-state metrics emphasize the importance of three
elements in determining the strength of a state: security,
219. The plight of the Somalilanders recalls Thomas Hobbes’ classical
description of life without the order provided by a functioning government: Citizens
live in “continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary,
poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 41 (Crawford Brough
Macpherson ed., Penguin Classics 1981) (1651).
220. See generally JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 112 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the
rarity of secession).
221. See generally Di John, supra note 78, at 6–10 (listing various metrics for
determining state weakening, collapse, and failure).
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political participation, and basic civil services.222 These
represent the basic functions of a state. Without these features,
a nation would lack the ability to maintain the order necessary
for a stable society. Without security, there is no check on
violence or crime, hampering both the health and economic
development of the state’s citizens.223 Without the ability to
participate in the political process, people lose the right to selfdetermination, calling the legitimacy of the government into
question.224 Without civil services, the state loses the
“institutions to regulate and adjudicate conflicts; [the] rule of
law, secure property rights, [and] contract enforcement.”225
In light of the presumption of deference to state
sovereignty, however, the legal test for justifiable secession from
a failed state should be narrow. The parent state should be
given every opportunity to correct its course before secessionists
are allowed to justifiably declare independence. To mitigate this
danger, the test should include a time element, as some analysts
have suggested.226 A state must be failing for a reasonable
amount of time before the secession can be justified. In addition,
the secessionists must overcome a threshold test. As a potential
state, it must be capable of the things that the failed state is
not. It must be able to provide security to its people.227 Some
mechanism of political participation must exist.228 The
secessionists must have the means to provide civil services.229
Most importantly, they must be able to operate a stable state for

222. See, e.g., id. at 4–5; Fund for Peace, supra note 82 (listing “Progressive
Deterioration of Public Services,” “Security Apparatus Operates as a ‘State Within a
State,” and “Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread
Violation of Human Rights” as indicators).
223. See Di John, supra note 78, at 4–6.
224. See Rotberg, supra note 80, at 9.
225. Di John, supra note 78, at 5. In addition, “no single indicator provides
certain evidence that a strong state has become weak or a weak state is beginning to
fail,” but taken together, these four indicators provide “a useful starting point to
define state failure . . . .” Id.
226. See id. at 9.
227. See Rotberg, supra note 80, at 3 (“The state’s prime function is to provide
. . . security—to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of
territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and
social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human
security; and to enable citizens to resolve their disputes with the state and with
their fellow inhabitants.”).
228. See id. (“Another key political good enables citizens to participate freely,
openly, and fully in politics and the political process.”).
229. See id. at 3–4 (listing various fundamental civil services provided by
functioning states).
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a reasonable amount of time. This test provides citizens of a
truly failed state the power to improve their condition and
exercise the right to self-determination, but not at the expense
of the sovereignty of the parent state, except, perhaps, in the
extreme cases when a state cannot even function as such.
One inquiry remains—to apply this test to Somaliland
within Somalia. Somalia is a failed state by any objective
measure. Some analyses place Somalia at the top of the list of
the world’s worst failures.230 Because of the violence of the civil
war, the government cannot even provide the most basic
functions of a state.231 Furthermore, because the civil war in the
south has been raging since 1991 with no signs of slowing,232
and there are few signs of improvement from the government,233
there is a strong argument that a reasonable amount of time
has passed since the country had a functioning government.
Conversely, during the same time period, Somaliland has shown
progression. After peace “broke out” in the region in the mid1990s, Somaliland has had a vibrant political culture, a form of
representative government, and enough security and stability to
experience a modicum of economic development.234 Somaliland’s
largest city, Hargeysa, even had its first traffic light installed
recently.235 Somaliland has demonstrated the ability to govern
itself while Somalia has not. Under the proposed test,
Somaliland can justifiably secede from Somalia, because it can
provide the basic functions of a government that Somalia
cannot, and Somalia has failed long enough to create a power
vacuum. Therefore an independent state of Somaliland would
not impinge upon Somali sovereignty.
CONCLUSION
Under the current international legal standards,
Somaliland cannot escape the volatility and anarchy of southern
Somalia. Internal self-determination is not possible because the
Somali state has failed and Somalilanders are unable to exercise

230. See, e.g., Fund for Peace, supra note 107; see also Di John, supra note 78, at
4 (“In extreme cases, failure may occur on all dimensions simultaneously as in
Somalia.”).
231. See Di John, supra note 78, at 4; see also, Draper, supra note 1, at 78–79.
232. See Draper, supra note 1, at 78.
233. See Mohammed & Childress, supra note 112, at A11.
234. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86.
235. See The Nation Nobody Knows, supra note 9, at 42.
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their political rights. In addition, international law currently
reserves secession for particular circumstances not applicable to
Somaliland. Secession is attainable under domestic law through
cooperation with the parent state,236 unilaterally in response to
human rights violations,237 or, arguably, through recognition by
other nations.238 There is a gap in the law of secession, however,
as it applies to failed states, such as Somalia. In recognition of
the devastating effects that a failed state has on its inhabitants,
the law of secession should allow secession when the parent
state has been unable to provide security, a functioning political
system, and civil services for a reasonable amount of time, and
when the secessionists have been able to provide each of these
state functions. Such a test improves upon the current laws of
secession by permitting those living within a failed state like
Somalia to escape the binds caused by the absence of
government while preserving state sovereignty by allowing
secession in only the most extreme situations.

236. See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 217, 273 (Can.).
237. See Sterio, supra note 55, 145–46 (discussing the current norms regarding
unilateral, or remedial, secession).
238. See Vidmar, supra note 32, at 827.

